The article deals with the forthcoming challenges to the German system of co-determination (Mitbestimmung) arising from the Europeanization of industrial relations (IR) in general and the European Company (Societas Europaea -SE) in particular. After some short remarks on co-determination 's national history and present challenges, recent political controversies are discussed. Then the most important European regulations on employee involvement are analysed from a German perspective. The main part of the article presents some first empirical results on the new SE form with particular emphasis on its impact on the existing German system. Finally, some tentative conclusions are made.
controversial discussions . All in all, changes to existing legal regulation have been rare and have only been made after changes of political majorities in the Federal parliament (Bundestag) .
One has to keep in mind that there is a strict, legal line of demarcation between co-determination and collectiv e bargaining (including bargaining autonomy or Tarifautonomie) in Germany, i.e. between IR at the enterprise and at the sectoral level.) In contrast to similar or functionally equivalent regulation in some other countries, the German system of co-detelmination has traditionally consisted of two legally separate but from an empirical perspective closely intelTelated parts. On the one hand, works councils (Betriebsriite) , which are elected at the lower or establishment level, have specific, legally guaranteed options of not only information, participation and consu ltation but also some veto rights in personal, economic and social affairs . On the other hand, employee representation at the upper or enterprise level exists on the supervisory board (Au!sichtsrat). 2
For several decades public as well as scho larly interest was clearly focused on the upper level, its practices and political options for change (Unternehmensmitbestimmung); works counci ls were cons idered, more or less, as an appendix to board-level representation. This fOlmer constellation of power and interest has complete ly changed since the late 1970s/early 1980s. Works counci ls have developed into more important corporate actors because of ongoing processes of flexibilization and ' organized decentralization' of IR (Keller, 2004) . Among others, they are involved in the implementation of collective agreements at enterprise level (Verbetrieblichung) . Therefore, more recent empirical research has hardly dealt with topics of board-level representation any more but concentrated on works councils' action including a broad range of old and new customs and practices.)
Most recently, however, the political discussion has experienced another, rather unexpected turn . Board-level representation and vigorous demands concerning its reform have made it back onto the political agenda. The emphasis of specific issues has also changed to a considerable degree : the present controversy no longer deals with industrial democracy (Wirtschajisdemokratie), a necessary cOlTe late of political democracy in the view of trade unions, but, first of all, with the various economic effects of works counci ls' actions on the parameters of firms (among others, on productivity, profitability, wages, investments, price increases) (Addison et aI., 2004; Dilger, 2002) . Over the recent decades, principles and strategies of cooperation have definitely gained in importance in contrast to conflictual ones.
Thus, the emphasis has shifted to a considerable degree from Mitbestimmung as employees' rights to productive factors. Emp loyee representation at board level has been less analysed (Junkes and Sadowski, 1999 ; more recent exceptions include Renaud, 2007; Vitols, 2006) . Results of this scarce research are inconclusive but seem to indicate that, in contrast to widespread assumptions, the effects do not tend to be unfavourable. 4 At the upper leve l the early Co-determination Act for the coa l and steel industlY (Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz 195 1) has gradually waned in importance because of the secular decline of these industries and now is applicab le to fewer than 40 companies . The Co-determination Act (1976) is more important because it is appli cable to some 700 companies. From the unions' point of view it has always been considered to be less farreaching because it introduces a different method of conflict resolution .
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For some decades employers and their associations were clearly on the defensive. They complained about bilateral forms of decision-making and opposed all further legal restrictions to their 'managerial prerogatives' . In the mid-1970s they legally challenged the Co-detennination Act, but lost their case. The Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) decided that the Act does not violate basic rights, as they had claimed. Since then, the widely accepted view among scholars and other external observers is that the employers learned how to get along with the existing fOlms of 'joint regulation' and managed to cope with legal changes they were not been able to prevent, despite using all political means. For some decades there was a general consensus about the usefulness and appropriateness of existing acts on co-detennination within the established social market economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft). Observers had the impression that a certain balance of power between capital and labour was politically defined and, enjoying a high level of tlUSt, respected by both sides of industry.
Most recently, however, employers' peak associations have pushed hard for major alterations to all IUles, i.e. for severe restrictions to, if not the complete abolition of existing legislation (BDAIBDI, 2004) . Their basic arguments were that the whole system was outdated, created major disadvantages for German companies on the international market and made it difficult for Gennan companies to find appropriate partners for mergers in general and the foundation of SEs (Societas Europaea, or the European Company) in particular. This position was supported by a group of scientists, mainly economists and lawyers (Von Werder, 2004) and reopened the donnant discussion on co-determination.
In 2005, a tripartite commission was officially set up by the government coalition between the Social Democrats and the Greens and, later on, confinned by its successor, the coalition between the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. It consisted of representatives of employers and employees as well as neutral academics and was supposed to make policy suggestions.
The employer representatives declined to participate in the commission's work once it became apparent that the majority of its members, especially the independent academics, would be recommending the existing German regulations in general tenns and would ignore the employers' vigorous demands for substantial changes towards deregulation. The employers finally expressed a separate view and repeated their claims for substantive changes. For example, it was argued that the German system should be amended in order to allow negotiations between employers and employees about content and rights of participation in individual companies (Donges et aI., 2007: 53) , or even to establish a 'liberal' model without any compulsory legal constraints, i.e. to abolish the existing forms .
The independent members saw no necessity for major changes but recommended only minor amendments (such as the option for more flexible anangements at company level, the inclusion of employees' representatives from foreign subsidiaries, but, for example, no cutting down of the size of the supervisOly body). They argued that there was, in contrast to the employers' assertions, no empirical evidence at all for negative effects of co-determination on competitiveness, capability and effectiveness of companies or the attraction of foreign capital (Biedenkopf et aI., 2006; see Hopner, 2007 for an overview). The unions all supported these assessments of the status quo. The grand coalition government was split and decided not to take any initiative for the time being.
The employers failed to convince with the arguments they put forward for change, for example that the ' internationalization' of the economy (Henssler, 2007) would put 'pressure' on the Gelman system of employee participation. In their harsh criticism of existing co-determination they also used the example of the European Company (SE) with its ' freely negotiable' employee participation system. Again their argument was that the 'facts' and options this new legal form provides would create certain 'pressures' on the existing Gelman system . Individual voices among the employer representatives are still using a similar argument: the government commission has not resulted in their favour, and now they are hying to use the SE as a new vehicle in order to achieve their farreaching political goals. Some companies want to cut down the size, or to be more precise the number of seats of their supelvisory board, but Gelman law doesn't provide for this. By converting to an SE they could do so (we return to this topic later on).
For the time being, the roll back strategies have not been successful. Nevertheless, despite the commission's report, the debate has not yet come to an end. Any future change within this highly 'contested telTain' will depend not on scientific results, especially of empirical research, but on future political majorities in the Bundestag, which are impossible to predict within the existing five-party system.
European regulation from a German perspective
Until the 1980s, systematic exchanges of views and international comparisons were rare but regularly included Gelmany. They used to argue that Gelman IR in general and its provisions for co-determination in particular were quite sophisticated, fairly advanced in comparative perspective and far-reaching in their consequences. The vast majority of domestic as well as foreign authors kept arguing that co-determination was the key explanatOlY variable for the long-lasting economic success, low rates of industrial conflict and high stability of German IR in the postwar decades. The impact of legal scholars, especially labour lawyers, has always been comparatively far-reaching because of the high degree of'juridification' (Verrechtlichung) of German IR (Weiss and Schmidt, 2000) .
The German variant is (as most national systems) quite 'introverted', only those employees working in German plants have voting rights while employees in foreign plants or subsidiaries do not (for a discussion on this issue, see Diiubler, 2007 : 274) . This constellation of rights and interests has changed very slowly and only gradually has it taken account of transnational perspectives. In other words, Europeanization, not to mention globalization, has only recently become relevant in the day-to-day practice of employee participation.
Employers' organizations hoped for an opportunity to escape existing national regulation and opted for no, or next to no, European regulation. Interestingly enough, they have frequently used European integration as an argument in favour of their demands to deregulate existing German legislation (Donges et aI., 2007: 48) . They have, for example, argued that the advanced German form would create difficulties and obstacles for German companies to become integrated into SEs and should, therefore, be deregulated.
German trade unions have feared a loss of power and impact in decision-making, especially in the fast-growing number of multinational companies. Processes of Europeanization have created a kind of 'strategic dilemma' for trade unions (Hyman, 2004) . In a broader perspective, unions argue enthusiastically for the establishment of a 'social dimension of the internal market' (in Delors' terms) and the development of a 'European social model' (in recent Euro-jargon) (Holand, 2005; Weiss, 2006) . In other words, progressing market integration should be accompanied by active measures towards social integration .
The question is whether existing standards of national regulation can be preserved in a more and more integrated economy or if they can be renewed by means of regulation at the European level. Increased international competition as well as the rise of international investors challenge the flexibility of the German system (Boyer, 2006: 143) . The EU has added a new layer of supranational regulation. Trade unions have therefore fought to preserve approved, existing national forms within new fOlms of European regulation. But it must also be said that 'The insistence on flexibility and the accompanying fact of greater use of soft-law techniques will not only potentially weaken the position of employees further against the combined forces of shareholders and management but indeed is likely to encourage the dismantling of national structures perceived to be inefficient' (Villiers, 2006: 210) .
The basic idea of the SE was to create a unified European company structure instead of the number of different ones in existence. The Commission's aim was to establish a European legal fOlm for companies in order to achieve 'European champions'. One of the crucial issues within this kind of further economic integration was the issue of employee participation or, in more general tel111S, social integration.
RegulatOlY attempts of the EU towards 'harmonization' of employee participation in a broad sense can be traced back to the early 1970s, ifnot the late 1960s (for an overview, see Gold, this issue; Gold and Schwimbersky, 2008) . The transfer of the relatively farreaching German variant was desirable for (not only Gelman) unions but did not succeed because all other EU member states were not willing to abolish their own national system and to copy a foreign one which some of them disliked, if not even rejected outright. 6 Therefore, several consecutive draft directives failed, and a political stalemate was reached.
All in all, the suggested changes were characterized by their increasing degree of flexibility. The first proposals involved introducing one, and only one, highly standardized model largely based on the German system of Mitbestimmung. Later on, proposals switched towards a menu of options companies were supposed to choose from; in this period the influence of the Gelman model dissipated. The project even disappeared from the political agenda for quite a few years (for a pointed analysis of the European Company Statute's long histOlY, see Sorge, 2006 Experts, 1997) . These experts were engaged by the Commission to resolve the long-lasting stalemate. In their final report they recommended that employees should be involved within SEs. In any event, all issues and rights of such an involvement should be freely negotiable between management and employees of the company concerned, allowing for the various forms of cultural traditions of participation within the member states. Such a 'flexible solution' would be preferable to so-called standardized rules, which would only come into effect in the event of negotiations between employers and employees failing within a specific company.
The All member states had to transpose the Directive into national law within three years (Gold and Schwimbersky, 2008) . One could argue, that the 'EU has begun to create a genuine "space" at EU level for worker participation' (Gold, 2005: IS) . National trade unions as well as their European affiliates took part in the negotiations on employee involvement in the first SEs as well as in its realization in the first cases, for example in developing training programmes for board-level representatives.
Societas Europaea and their impact on the German system
The impact of European regulations on various national systems of IR differs to a considerable degree. 8 We have looked at the first SEs to demonstrate these effects in some detail. SEs, as a new 'European legal form' for companies, have been in existence since October 2004. So far, however, their overall number has remained rather small because of its purely optional nature (Keller and Werner, 2008) . By IS June 20 10, exactly ISO ' normal' SEs (i.e. companies with economic activities and employees) were registered; more are in the process offormationY From an empirical perspective the detailed analysis of these first cases is of great importance not only in themselves but also because they establish the pattern for all future cases and developments. lo First of all, the general pattern of employee involvement at the European level is completely different from the national experience and constitutes a paradigm shift from the German perspective . Autonomously negotiated instead of legally installed forms (verhandelte Mitbestimmung) were completely unknown at the national level before the implementation of the European Works Councils (EWC) Directive in the mid-1990s.
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The peculiar combination of legislation and negotiation at enterprise level creates new challenges for the various actors, who are without any experience in this regard. Among others, knowledge of existing European regulations, the fotmation of Special Negotiating Bodies (SNBs) representing heterogeneous, if not contradictoty national interests, the level of expertise and infOlmation of their members, the conduct of voluntary negotiations with management as well as with employees' representatives from other countries, the binding conclusion of enterprise-specific agreements and their probably protracted implementation and compliance procedures all constitute new and yet unknown tasks and chall enges (Keller and Werner, 2008) . The specific division of labour between works councils and board-level representation to be negotiated at the level of the individual enterprise is also fairly unusual in contrast to the relatively unitary, legal regulation at national level.
Negotiated fonns of employee involvement will, almost by definition, lead to an increasing degree of heterogeneity between individual SEs (and, of course, national companies operating under another legal fonn) instead of some minimal homogeneity and a celtain level of standardization across industries in the case of legal enactment. Its consequences will consist in the development of new, tailor-made alTangements and, thus, an overall loss of transparency. No SE will be like any other in terms of infonllation and consultation. In qualitative telms, negotiated opportunities for 'infonnation and consultation' at the European level are weaker than the legal rights of strict co-detelmination at the national level. It could possibly lead to some new fonn of 'enterprise-specific' TR that would be separate from regular national or sector-specific fOlms and would exist alongside them .
A second major difference is the h'ansition from substantive to procedural regulation at supranational level (Schmidt, 2005) . On the one hand, one could of course argue that the politically motivated decision in favour of this shift constitutes another typical example of the dominance of the neoliberal (or neovoluntaristic) deregulatOlY approach. On the other hand, the long history of failed draft directives demonstrates that any kind of substantive regulation is impossible to achieve. The procedural variant constitutes nowadays the only realistic alternative for supranational regulation in an EU of 27 members comprising heterogeneous TR systems that are resistant to fundamental change. This approach, which has become not only prominent but even dominant since the draft directives of the early 1990s, attempts to protect highly developed systems (such as those in Gennany or Scandinavia) against any deterioration; but as we have already argued, pressure on advanced systems cannot be totally prevented. This is especially hue for employees who have a reactive role because the SE foundation process is initiated by management (Gold and Schwimbersky, 2008: 57) .
The SE Directive consists exclusively of procedural issues. All substantive ones are negotiated at the enterprise level between central management and the SNB as the representative organ of employees. These autonomous negotiations have to be concluded before the official registration of the SE can take place. They have mostly always led to some kind of results because no side is interested in their failure. These procedures result in tailor-made, rather 'flexible' and non-standard fonns of information and consultation. Nonetheless, it is obvious, as in the case of EWCs (Kerckhofs, 2006) , that national TR traditions and trajectories are not completely abolished but exert a strong influence on the specific fonns ofinfonnation and consultation in SEs. Popular hypotheses arguing in favour of emerging trends towards upward ' hannonization ' or more or less 'convergence' in functional or institutional respects are not supported by actual developments.
Surprisingly, the opposite assumption is cOlTect: national institutions as well as their 'customs and practice' persist. For instance, SEs do have a choice if they want to establish an SE works council. It can be designed as an employee-only body, as is common practice in Germany for instance, or a so-called 'joint body' with employees' and employers' representatives, as is common practice for instance in France (Auberger and Conchon, 2009). So far, at least, SEs have followed specific national path dependencies : for example, only those SEs having their headquarters in France have established a 'joint body', while all SEs having their headquarters in Gelmany or Austria have decided to establish an employee-only SE works council (Keller and Werner, 2008) .
Third, another important peculiarity has to do with the special characteristics of national company law and corporate governance. ' One-tier systems', which exist, principally, in Anglo-Saxon countries, have an administrative board (or board of directors) only. ' Two-tier systems', prevalent among others in Gelmany, consist of a management board (Vorstand) and a supervisOly board (Auftichtsrat) which controls and monitors the fOlmer. It is difficult to prove any general superiority of one or other of these f0ll11S (Nagel, 2007) . SEs, however, can choose freely between a one-or two-tier system. This European provision creates a brand new option for German companies. The decision to opt for one or the other cannot be directly influenced by employee representatives, but, in the Gell11an case, is finally made by the company's general assembly (Hauptversammlung) after a proposal by the company's management. In this way, management sets the agenda for all forthcoming negotiations.
It is not surprising that the majority of existing n0ll11al SEs, especially the bigger ones, follow their national trajectories. Nevertheless, some remarkable transfOlmations have happened -but only in the direction from two-tier to one-tier systems. In absolute terms, regardless of company size, the number making this move comes close to 50 percent of the existing nOlmal SE companies in Germany. Plausible motives for these developments are (still) difficult to detect. More detailed analysis shows that these tend to be smaller, usually family-owned companies that are IUn by an actively involved owner (Familienunternehmen). They have a strict preference for a corporate governance StIUCture of their own choice and do not see any need for close cooperation with some kind of supervisory board, especially not one comprising a significant number of influential employee representatives. In other words, they strictly favour opportunities for infOlmation and consultation through a SE works council only. In this regard one has to keep in mind that, in contrast to the Ewe Directive, the SE requires no thresholds of employees to be fulfilled .
For the time being, the number of SEs founded is too small a sample to predict a trend and it remains to be seen if there will be a larger number of similar companies copying this strategy. A sequence of pattern setting and pattern following is a likely result. The present overall importance depends on the selected indicator. If we only count numbers of compani es their significance is higher than if there is a weighting by the number of employees concerned.
Fourth, there are certain but not dominant trends towards 'slimmer' and smaller boards or, to be more precise, towards smaller supervisory boards but not the board of directors . In other words, the standardization and/or simplification of governance StIUCtures constitute a goal that is legally provided in the Directive but excluded by national law. Some SEs with headquarters in Germany have reduced the number of seats on their supervisory boards. In such cases this measure takes place on both sides and, thus, affects employer and employee representatives equally. Therefore, this reduction in size does not mean the restriction of co-determination rights in a nan-ow sense as trade unions sometimes assume.
In this specific context what is remarkable, however, is that the composition of the boards concerned has been changed, or to be more precise, the number of external members has been reduced. 12 This reduction of external representatives seems to be one of the implicit motives and goals of management, especially in large SEs. Again, it applies to both sides. On the employees ' side it means, however, that union representatives have lost a disproportionate number of seats. Therefore the external influence on processes of decision-making will probably be more limited than it has been on exclusively Gelman boards in the past. Again, this trend might lead to the effect that 'insider' interests will dominate processes of decision-making more strongly than in the past when 'outsider' interests were represented by external members.
Fifth, as mentioned before, employers' associations have argued since the I 970s that the existence of comparatively strict statutory co-determination rights would create decisive disadvantages for Gelman companies when partners had to be selected for establishing an SE. More recently, they have frequently reiterated this argument of future disadvantages in international competitiveness as a major part of their lobbying activities for the retrenchment of all existing national regulation (Von Werder, 2004) . The argument is, however, of a political not empirical nature. Most recent empirical evidence shows that it is definitely not valid and that there exists no disadvantage for German companies (Keller and Werner, 2008) . A surprisingly high number of nonnal SEs, or to be more precise about one-half, have their headquarters in Germany, some others in Austria, but very few in other EU member states with few or non-existent rights of codetelmination. For example, there are no nOlmal SEs yet registered in the UK or in the Meditenanean member states or, in more general terms, in countries with weaker rights of participation. Furthermore, the most recent 'eastern enlargement' of the EU has had almost no consequences in this regard. 13
The size of SEs, or to be more precise the number of their employees, differs to a remarkable degree. There are MNCs as well as SMEs involved and it is still too early to indicate general trends because the overall number is still too small. Certain thresholds in terms of numbers are of major relevance or, in other words, institutional anangements at the national level differ. At least at first glance, it is quite surprising that several Gennan companies with still fewer than (but approaching) 2000 employees have formed SES.14 A similar trend can be observed in cases with fewer than (but close to) 500 employees.
IS One could argue that these companies have successfully been able to avoid their integration into stricter national forms of co-detennination. It would be inaccurate, however, to interpret this emerging trend as a strict 'escape from co-detelmination' ('Mitbestimmungsflucht ') because they have never been subject to its stricter version . Thus, the foundation of an SE creates and provides for companies of a certain size a new, additional opportunity to avoid stricter forms of regulation at the national level. In former times of purely national regulation, other options did exist but needed the input of more scarce resources . Such companies had, for instance, to find/establish a foreign limited partner, a 'solution' used by quite a number of companies (Sick, 2008) . Nowadays, they can 'freeze' the status quo of co-determination more easily in the short run and confine its extent in the long run.
All in all, this trend constitutes a result of the new European legislation no actor had expected at the beginning. It is obviously a consequence originally unintended by the European actors but, later on in the stage of implementation, realized at the level of individual companies.
Conclusions: Societas Europaea and their impact on national industrial relations
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At least for the time being two major caveats have to be made. In comparison with research on EWCs we are still at the stage of Article 13 agreements. First, there are no general, unitary or overarching motives for the foundation ofSEs. More specific reasons are related to the size of companies and the countries of origin. As indicated, there are certain advantages motivating SMEs, especially Gennan ones, such as the circumvention of stricter national regulation or the freezing of existing standards of co-detelmination. Other motivations, such as considerable savings of transaction costs, are valid for bigger companies, primarily MNCs. Second, it is still too early for empirical studies on employee involvement practices in the everyday activities of SEs. Such work will be of impol1ance in the next generation of research, which will have to deal with more profound theory building.
In the short IUn, the impact of SEs on the development of national IR will remain limited because of their still small, but growing, number. The establishment of an SE constitutes only one additional option for national companies to take and there is no obligation or legal necessity to choose this legal fOlm. Therefore, for the time being, it is not justified to assert any imminent danger for national IR in general or for German codetennination in particular. In the long IUn, however, the option of establishing an SE, with all its possibilities as described, could create a threat from employers, even if some observers argue that its legal design would not constitute a direct danger for the Gelman co-determination system (Streeck, 2007: 12) .
One other argument should not be dismissed: companies that want to avoid codetermination now have an easier legal option to do so. The traditional companies with established models of co-detennination will certainly preserve them, at least in their main establishments. Nevertheless, new and upcoming companies do have the possibility to decide quite autonomously on their specific fonns of corporate governance and the level of employee involvement they are willing to accept. In the future, such fast growing companies, especially in the private service sectors, could have a more important role. Teichmann (2007) argues that this situation could also lead to a competition between different national legislators within the EU.
The protracted histOlY of the SE project since the early 1970s demonstrates that all attempts at 'hard' legal regulation are doomed to failure because of existing differences between national interests. The only politically viable option especially in the present EU of27 member states is ' soft' regulation. This result is disappointing from a more substantive point of view but constitutes the only realistic strategy towards a European solution. To expect an improvement and/or increase of industrial democracy by ' hard' regulation would be completely unrealistic.
Last but not least, one could ask if another mode of regulation, i.e. social dialogue instead of directives, would have let to stricter results. But, the point of no return was reached years ago when the Commission made the decision in favour of the Directive. Furthermore, the present state of social dialogues raises profound doubts about their superiority: so far only non-binding results have been reached in the post-Lisbon era. There sectoral variants of social dialogue are even less developed than the interprofessional one.
Notes
I. This demarcation is also relevant as far as corporate actors are concerned. Works councils are the most important actors on the one level, and trade unions on the other; also their instmments of interest representation differ (principle of peaceful cooperation vs access to legal strikes). Traditional co-determination has exclusively consisted of indirect forms by elected representatives whereas more recent forms of participation are of a direct, individual nature. The decisive question of future relevance is, of course, if both forms of 'voice' are compatible with each other or mutually exclusive. 2. Furthermore, they participate in the election of the so-called Arbeitsdirektor, a full member of the management board who is usually in charge of human resource management and industrial relations. 3. In the late 1990s a comprehensive report revealed, among other things, the existence of significant ' blind spots' on the co-determination landscape (mitbestimmungsfreie Zonen) (Bertelsmann-Stiftung/Hans-Biickler-Stiftung, 1998). Amazingly enough, only about one in two employees is represented by the institution of works councils; the most decisive variable is the company size (Ellguth and Kohaut, 2007) . Coverage rates at sectoral level, still the dominant level of collective bargaining within the dual system of IR, are even lower and have been declining to a considerable degree since the mid-I 990s. As a matter of fact, the German IR system is less 'dual' than frequently assumed in public debates; only a minority of eligible employees are simultaneously covered at both levels. Thus, the necessary legal-institutional prerequisites for the functioning of the dual system are incomplete. 4. Economists have entered the IR arena and challenged social scientists' domain and points of view, even though in recent years co-determination has also been regarded as being one element in the debate on 'good corporate governance'. 5. In stand-offs the chairperson ofthe sup ervisory board gets a second voice. He or she, however, is always a representative ofthe employers' side. 6. In political terms, unanimity in the Council of Ministers was a necessary condition of political decision-making but could never be achieved. 7. The first draft directives of the 1970s integrated both components of employee participation.
Later on, they were separated for political reasons. It took a long time and lots of political effort before the EWC Directive was finally passed and implemented in the mid-I 990s. It covers, however, only the company level, i.e. board-level representation is left out. As explained in this article it took even longer before the Statute for a European Company and the corresponding Directive on employee involvement were finally agreed upon in 200 I (Keller, 2002; Kostler, 2004 ; see also Stuhr, 2007 , for some legal notes on the area of conflict between [existing] national and 'European' law). 8. Some aspects of the ongoing European discussion on various forms of employee involvement remain almost unnoticed in Germany because they are of next to no practical relevance. One prototypical example is the Directive on national information and consultation that is not required to be implemented in the established German system of co-determination. It is, however, of major relevance in the UK, Ireland and the majority of newer EU member states. 9. Furthermore, there are quite a number of 'shelf SEs' (as of 15 June 2010, 593 SEs have been registered in total, but, as mentioned, only 150 out of them are 'nonnal' ones). These companies have neither economic activities nor employees and are usually established by legal firms (Anwaltskanzleien) . The reasons are not known exactly. Most likely they are to be sold on in order to simplify and accelerate the foundation process. These companies are concentrated in Germany and the Czech Republic; the majority follows the one-tier stmcture.
It seems that the monistic corporate governance stmcture is also used as a sales argument (Bayer and Schmidt, 2007) . Besides shelf SEs there also exist so-called 'empty SEs ', they are economically active (for instance as financial holdings), but have no employees. 10. Various forms of establishment exist (merger, holding company, subsidiary, conversion).
Until now, only mergers and conversions have been utilized in normal SE cases. The form of establishment has consequences for the kind of employee representation because the standard mles differ (Gold and Schwimbersky, 2008 ). II. At European level the opposite is tme, legal forms are only of relevance if negotiations fail.
This sinIation has only happened once so far in the case of SEs. 12. According to the German co-determination law there are internal members, i.e. representatives from the company, as well as external ones, i.e. union representatives, on the employees' side of the supervisory board. 13. Furthermore, transfer of headquarters, which are easily possible according to the Statute, has so far been a very rare event regarding normal SEs. 14. The Co-determination Act of 1976 (para. 7) prescribes the exact numbers : 12 members in companies with fewer than 10,000 employees, 16 members in companies with more than 10,000 but fewer than 20,000 employees, 20 members in companies with more than 20,000 employees. 15. According to German law, smaller companies with 500-2000 employees and certain legal forms have to have one-third employee representatives on their supervisory board (One-Third Participation Act [Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz] of2004); bigger companies with more than 2000 employees are required to have, according to the Co-determination Act of 1976, an equal representation on their supervisory board.
